TABLE SHOWS, IN DESCENDING ORDER OF "RIGHTWINGNESS," PUBLIC OPINION ON THE QUESTIONS ASKED (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

	"Right"		"Left"	
Crime: In general do you think that punishment given to people convicted of crimes in Britian is too severe, not tought enough, or about right?	Punishment not tough enough	[1] 83	Punishment too severe	[1] 1
Unemployment benefits: Do you think it would be better or worse if its was more difficult to get unemployment benefits—the "dole"?	Better if "dole" more difficult	79	Worse if "dole" more difficult	13
Taxation and social services: Which do you think is more important—to reduce taxation, or to increase and to improve the social services?	Reduce taxes	67	Increase and improve social services	20
Economic affairs: Some people say the Government should have a bigger say in the control and planning of industry, other people think the Government already interfere too much. Which do you think?	Government interfere too much	66	Government should have bigger say	20
Racial discrimination: Do you think it should be against the law to refuse a job to someone because of his race or color?	Should not be against the law	53	Should be against the law	42
Rhodesia: If there was a civil war in Rhodesia between white Rhodesians and black Rhodesians which side would you want to win?	Support white Rhodesians	44	Support black Rhodesians	17
Elitist/Populist Government: Which do you think is more important in a government—education and experience of governing, or understanding how ordinary people feel and think?	Education and experience	36	Understanding ordinary people	54

[1] 12 percent think the current situation is about right.

Note; The balance of percentages is made up by "don't knows."

However, it is not too difficult to see a likely explanation of the apparent inconsistency. The objection of most people is probably to the *abuse* of unemployment benefit which they believe is too prevalent—not to its application to deserving cases, in which category each man would presumably include himself if the need arose.

In assessing the 53 per cent, who, in the present poll, do not believe that racial discrimination should be against the law, allowance must be made for the position of many Conservatives who, though totally opposed in principle to racial discrimination believe it to be difficult, or impossible, to prevent by law.

In general there was little between the sexes on most of the questions asked.

The main differences were between age groups and classes. The middle-age groups (35–54) were much more Right-wing on Social Services and taxation than either the under-35s or the over-55s.

The middle-classes were more Right-wing on taxation and the social services, on economic policy and on "élitist" versus "populist" government; the working classes on Rhodesia as well as crime.

The fact that the only "Left-wing" majority response was in favour of a government "understanding ordinary people" as against the "élitist" (Conservative?) concept, presumably explains the discrepancy between the general predominance of Right-wing attitudes and the weight of built-in support for Labour in the electorate, particularly the working classes.

In the extremity of the polling booths, many voters will stomach particular Left-wing attitudes which predominate among Labour activists because they believe that Labour in general is the party which best represents working-people's material interests.

The crucial political question is how far this approach will remain for Labour an effective bulwark against the hardening of Right-wing attitudes on almost every major individual issue of social and economic policy.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GORE in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE APPROPRIATIONS, 1969

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 18037) making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and related agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

WAIVER OF RULE OF GERMANENESS

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed with my address, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of rule VIII, dealing with germaneness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CRISIS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: MOSCOW AT A CROSSROADS

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, on July 29 I addressed this distinguished body on the crisis in Czechoslovakia. On that occasion, I warned of the real possibility of a Soviet military intervention, a repetition of the Hungarian tragedy of 1956.

My fears were justified.

At that time, the general expectation seemed to be that the Soviets would not invade Czechoslovakia, and the conclusion of the conferences at Cierna and Bratislava early in August seemed to fortify the judgment of those who believed that the Soviets had decided to compromise and permit Czechoslovakia's distinctive road to socialism.

CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW

It was in this evolving mood of hopeful expectation that I left the United States early in August to attend the Seventh World Power Conference in Moscow. I was assigned by the Senate Commerce Committee, along with my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, the Honorable HUGH SCOTT, to represent the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce as a delegate to this conference.

I might add that this World Power Conference is made up of representatives of some 40 principal industrial nations of the world. It is held approximately every 4 years; this was the first World Conference in the Soviet Union. The conference lasted 4 days, from August 20 through 24, and I am proud to say that the United States played a prominent part in the technical discussions that were undertaken.

Prior to the convening of the conference, however, it was my opportunity and good fortune to visit various parts of the Soviet Union. In large measure, I retraced the route I had taken 9 years ago when I was chairman of a committee that was sent by the Senate to survey the water and power resources of the Soviet Union, and to report as to how they compared with those of the United States. I went out to Siberia, the Soviet Union's frontier, as far as Irkutsk and Bratsk, then down into Soviet Central Asia to Tashkent, Baku, and to Yerevan, and finally we flew to Leningrad. In all, I was gone about 18 days.

For me, this return trip to the Soviet Union was most instructive. The Soviets continue to make great progress in this field of power development. Their great hydro and thermal power stations are huge and efficient. In the technique of long-line transmission at high voltage the Soviets are undoubted leaders. In 9 years they have progressed greatly and their momentum continues.

My inspection prior to the power conference was completed and I was in Moscow during the most serious moments of the crisis in Czechoslovakia; for it was in those 4 days of the World Power Conference, August 20 to 24, that the second chapter of this crisis was being written, a chapter that we well know has been filled with tragedy, anguish, and despair.

STATEMENT IN COPENHAGEN

In the days preceding Soviet military intervention, I continued to be skeptical of the optimistic judgment that the Soviets would not so intervene. While in Copenhagen on August 7, during a stopover on the way to Moscow, I issued a statement in which I recalled my doubts expressed in the speech of July 29 and, directing my attention to the conclusion of the Cierna-Bratislava conferences, declared that we should view with cautious concern the drama unfolding in Central Europe. I expressed the hope that the ancient and proud people of Czechoslovakia might indeed regain full freedom, independence and self-determination, suggesting further that the Soviets would gain by permitting this course and in building a friendship of equals in political and economic independence.

Alluding to the great economic and military power of the Soviet Union, I expressed the further hope that a spirit of detente and cooperation would grow between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and indeed among all nations of the world. But I warned that the suppression of freedom by the use of military threats and actual force would lead only to wider conflict and to an escalation of the arms race rather than political agreement and, the hope of all mankind, arms control.

THE INVASION VIEWED FROM MOSCOW

Unfortunately, my skepticism of Soviet acceptance of Czechoslovakia's new road to socialism was proved correct by developments on the opening day of the conference, August 20. For, on that day Soviet military forces, along with units from Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary, numbering, we were told, some 600,000 men, invaded Czechoslovakia and set out on a course to crush by force of arms the movement toward liberalization in that country.

Immediately, the Soviet press attempted to justify this military intervention. It was reported that Czechoslovak citizens concerned about the trend toward "counterrevolution," asked for Soviet assistance. Thus the best face was put on this brutal display of military power. Major efforts were made to seal off the U.S.S.R. from all information from the West. For the first time in about 6 years, the Soviets jammed all broadcasts in the Russian language that were coming into the Soviet Union, and we expected that they soon would jam all other foreign broadcasts.

In view of this political crisis and its implications for American policy, especially with the conference opening, the American Embassy in Moscow got in touch with us at once. Both Senator SCOTT and I conferred with Embassy officials on the advisability of withdrawing from the conference or otherwise expressing our disapprovel. Ultimately, we decided that no practical value could be achieved by a walkout; much important work was to be done at this conference; and such a conference, essentially dealing with technical matters, was not really the proper channel through which to lodge a protest.

However, both Senator SCOTT and I advised our Embassy authorities that we thought they should make it perfectly clear to the Russians that we disapproved of the Soviet action and that we urged the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia. We agreed to express such sentiments at any appropriate time and place.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION

The Soviet invasion was swift; the military occupation was total. Czechoslovakia's military forces were no match for the 600,000 invaders. The invasion was unexpected; hence, Czechoslovakia was unprepared. Wisely, Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and other Government leaders urged the Czechoslovak people to acquiesce in this brutal military act, to avoid provocations that would bring on bloodshed, and to support their own government in its efforts to reach some sort of a negotiated settlement with the invader. The goal of Dubcek was to reach agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet forces as quickly as possible and hope to resume the work of liberalization begun in January 1968.

Once again Soviet military forces were in Czechoslovakia but in 1945 they came as liberators, this time as oppressors. The contrast was not ignored by Czechoslovaks who taunted the invaders, painted swastika signs on their tanks, greeted them with cold contempt, staged strikes, and in countless individual acts demonstrated their hostility.

Faced with this awesome display of Soviet power, the people of Czechoslovakia were determined to resist, not by a senseless resort to military force, which ultimately could not succeed, but in a uniquely Czechoslovak manner of defiance by inaction, a sort of passive acquiescence in the inevitable but in a spirit that would draw world attention to this colossal blunder by the Soviet Union.

The people of Czechoslovakia listened to their leaders and in general abided by their warnings. Negotiations were undertaken at Moscow, negotiations in which the Prague leaders, who were spirited off to Moscow like common criminals, had little other choice than to accept the terms dictated by the Soviet Union. We are now told that at one point in the discussions the Russians, when faced with continued Czechoslovak resistance to their demands, stated categorically that they would destroy Czechoslovakia, annex Slovakia and establish a military protectorate over the Czech lands. The Czechoslovak leaders threatened suicide if this were done.

The Soviets appeared to be determined to destroy the enlightened Dubcek regime, set up a quisling government, and turn back the clock to Stalinism by imposing a new era of harsh suppression.

But the Soviets had miscalculated: They expected Dubcek to collapse under Soviet military pressure and they then could inaugurate a political takeover with little difficulty. However, they had failed to judge correctly the temper of the people, the attitude of the party, and the collective loyalty of the Czechs to their leaders.

The people resisted courageously, but passively and without undue provocation; they were unmoved in their support of Dubcek.

The Communist Party, having met in a secret congress, determined to support their Czech leaders.

The entire Czechoslovak nation was behind their Government, a very unusual spectacle in a Communist country.

Thus, the Soviets succeeded militarily but failed politically.

A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Faced with the open hostility of the Czechoslovak masses and an obstinate, popularly supported Government in Prague, the Soviets were left with only two alternatives: They could clamp down upon Czechoslovakia a military government with a Soviet military governor in command—clearly, they had the power to do this—or they could restore the Dubcek-Svoboda regime, and through negotiations reach a political agreement, the heart of which would be the continuation of the Government, but under serious, Soviet-imposed restrictions.

The Soviets chose the latter course.

Dubcek, who had been charged with treason by Moscow, was permitted to resume his position by the terms of a new compromise settlement. Other terms reached at Moscow were said to include a phased withdrawal of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, but with the acceptance of a permanent garrison force of two Soviet divisions on the West German border and the reimposition of censorship. Whatever other terms were in the agreement and how the Soviets will play out their role as occupiers, are matters to be determined in the future. The essential point is that the Soviets are in control. However, this presence of power ought not to obscure the fact that the Russians have on their hands an enormous political problem, one which they clearly had not thought out in their hasty resort to military force; namely, the problem of leading a people.

At the moment, the people of Czechoslovakia are adjusting to the new situation. This is not easy, for fear infects the environment of this country as all are bracing for a new era of Soviet oppression. Purges of liberals are expected; the Soviets are said to have lists of thousands to be removed from the party and the Government. Censorship of the press and all other media of mass communications has been instituted. Czechoslovak citizens are fleeing their country by the thousands.

Uncertainty and fear seem to be the dominant mood of the nation as the engine of Soviet tyranny gives every indication of consuming the liberal leaders of Czechoslovakia and arresting their course of liberalization.

AMERICA'S RESPONSE

Earlier this year, the official response of the U.S. Government toward Dubeck's liberalization in Czechoslovakia was one of cautious optimism. Our Government did not want to embarrass the new regime by seeming to encourage a too rapid reorientation of Prague's foreign policy. We realized that the Dubcek government was in a difficult position in its relations with Moscow and any undue haste on our part to applaud the Czechoslovaks could hinder rather than assist the Prague government in its search for a new independent road.

Moreover, there was little else in a practical way that we could do beyond making understanding gestures; for in the power relationship that has taken shape between East and West during the postwar decade, Eastern Europe has come to be recognized internationally, by implication rather than by specific agreement, as a particular area of vital interest to the Soviet Union. For this reason, the United States did not intervene militarily in Hungary during the revolution of 1956; the underlying presumption was that a thrust by the United States into this area of Soviet vital interests could trigger a third world war, and this could be a thermonuclear war. Thus, in 1968, as in 1956, we were boxed in by existing political realities and by the

harsh realization that the danger of thermonuclear war, like the sword of Damocles, hangs over all crises between East and West.

So, as the Czechoslovak crisis reached a new and dangerous stage in July, the United States was again faced with the same realities that existed in 1956; indeed the situation was even more complicated by our massive military commitment to Vietnam. The administration acted wisely, I believe, in its efforts to caution the Soviets against intervention. By a series of informal actions, the Soviets were made fully aware of the negative impact intervention would have on American public opinion and also how this would be translated into a slowing down of the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.

But the Soviets must have placed their relations with Washington on a lower priority; they were willing to accept the risk of a negative impact on their relations with the United States which might be caused by their invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Americans were naturally stunned and shocked by the military invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. They did not expect it. Apparently, administration officials and specialists in the Government felt certain that the Soviets were willing to accept the Cierna-Bratislava settlement, at least momentarily. It was presumed that continuing détente in relations with the West, unity of the world Communist movement, and the obvious good behavior of the Dubcek government would together stand as valid arguments against the risk to their policies that was inherent in any invasion.

SOVIET DECISION FOR INTERVENTION

Presumably, these were valid assumptions during the first weeks after Cierna and Bratislava; it seemed as if the Soviets were indeed acting upon the terms of agreement announced. But military maneuvers were resumed in western Russia. These were ominous signs of things to come, for now we know these maneuvers were actually preparations for a possible invasion.

However, the final decision to intervene is believed not to have been made until the day before the actual invasion on August 20. On that occasion, some Soviet leaders were called back from their vacations; presumably some members of the Central Committee were consulted; and the decision was made at the highest level of political authority; that is, the party's Politburo.

Reports in the press indicate that the military, especially Marshal Grechko, had played a major role in influencing the political leadership; the military had long wanted a Soviet force in Czechoslovakia as added security against West Germany. The hardliners in the collective leadership, notably Pyotr Shelest and Andrei Kirilenko and possibly Shelepin, coalesced with the military, it is surmised, against those opposing intervention; the balance was tipped accordingly. Kosygin, Brezhnev, and Suslov were believed to be opposed to intervention.

WHY THE SOVIETS INVADED

The reasons for Soviet intervention must, of course, be a matter of conjecture. On the basis of what the Russians have said thus far and what was said during June and July, it seems evident that fear of the spreading infection of Czechoslovak liberalism was the primary reason for intervention.

The Russians have been profoundly troubled by dissenting intellectuals in the U.S.S.R. In recent years, they have desperately tried to suppress them. The Soviet intelligentsia, notably the writers and some scientists, have advocated a wider range of freedom; they applauded enthusiastically liberalizing developments in Prague. The implication seemed to be that here was a model for the future, a scheme for leading Communist countries out of the dismal impasse in which they have found themselves, a scheme which had the promise of reconciling political authoritarianism with the irrepressible forward thrust of the human spirit into new realms of creativity.

But Soviet Russia was not alone in its trouble with the intellectuals. Poland has had its dissenters, and they have made their grievances known. Late in 1967 and early in 1968, some of Poland's leading philosophers, teachers, and writers joined with dissenting students in protesting against cultural suppression in their country. Gomulka responded with massive repression, with the result that Poland, in counterpart to Czechoslovakia, has moved progressively to the right to the extent that observers now speak of a new Stalinism, even neo-Fascism, in a Poland suffused with heightened nationalism, acute authoritarianism, and blatant anti-Semitism. Gomulka fears the intellectual; and the dissenting intellectual he fears with a passion. He disliked what was going on in Prague; developments there were a threat to his regime, and he wanted something done about it.

East Germany, too, has been concerned about the infection of liberalism. While Ulbricht, unlike Gomulka in Poland, has instituted some economic reforms, and thus has improved the nation's economy, he has not modified his harsh Stalinist rule. He, too, feared the liberalizing developments in Prague.

Thus, fear of spreading liberalization—an acute concern for a threat in the ideological realm—was a key factor in the decision to intervene. Moscow was not alone in its purposes; it had willing allies in Poland and East Germany whose interests coalesced.

The other reason for intervention was undoubtedly related to national security, that is, a fear that liberalization in Czechoslovakia would create a chink in the defensive wall in this vital northern tier area adjoining West Germany. Soviet, Polish, and East German vital security interests are deeply involved here. Apparently, they came to believe that Dubcek's reformers could not be trusted to protect this vital sector against the possible threat of a resurging West Germany.

Together, the ideological and strategic factors apparently combined to persuade the Soviets that there was justification for intervention. These factors took a higher priority in the scale of Soviet foreign policy interests, so detente with the West and unity of the world Communist bloc had to go by the board.

JUSTIFICATION QUESTIONED

But, we might ask, was Soviet intervention justified?

Certainly on the ideological level the Dubcek government had given repeated assurances of its fidelity to Communist doctrine. This was done both by word and by deed. The 2,000-word statement by Czechoslovak liberal intellectuals asking for wider liberties and for forceful action against the conservative element within the regime was soundly rejected by the government. Moreover, administrative actions were taken that reduced the influence of the liberals and widened that of the conservatives. In addition, Dubcek had made it clear that competing parties would not be permitted; the monopoly of political power in Czechoslovakia was to continue in the CPC.

What Dubcek and his reformers were trying to do was not to destroy communism, but to purge it of some of its most offensive characteristics; their goals were to maintain the prerogatives of the party and preserve the essentials of doctrine. So sure were they of popular support for their brand of communism that they permitted a larger area of intellectual freedom. We must remember that these writers and journalists who supported the regime and subsequently were attacked by Moscow, are Communists; they are committed to the fundamental concepts of Marxism-Leninism. But these reformers, this new breed of Communists, sought to make communism work as a viable political system. They had seen doctrinaire communism bring the most progressive country in Eastern Europe before World War II to a point of ruin. But, rather than change the basic concepts governing this country, they sought to liberalize the national environment and at once harness the entire energies of the nation for the sake of making communism a success in Czechoslovakia. Even dissenting Soviet intellectuals saw in developments in Prague the possibility of a new form of communism that, adapted to the Soviet setting, would permit a massive thrust forward for Soviet power and world communism.

Dubcek's reformers were no threat to Moscow: If they could have created a humanistic socialism popularly supported and combining the best of public and private economic systems, that would have been a new model for world communism, especially in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

On the security level, Dubcek and his reformers were even less a threat to Moscow than on the ideological level. Time and again they reaffirmed their allegiance to Moscow's security system, the Warsaw Pact. These were not idle, meaningless declarations; they were declarations derived from the natural law of politics; that is, that smaller nations gravitate to the political orbit of great powers particularly when faced with what they believe to be a common danger—in Czechoslovakia's case what it regards as the potential threat from a resurging Germany.

As a people, Czechoslovakia suffered more from the Nazi war machine in proportion, than did the Soviet Union. None will ever forget Lidice. So their concern

over German militarism is a real one, a concern derived from harsh experience. And it is ironic that the first Germans to violate Czechoslovakia's frontiers since 1945 came from the "fraternal" Communist East Germans.

Moreover, a serious issue remains bebetween Germany and Czechoslovakia; namely, the irredentist ambitions of the many millions of Sudeten Germans who were expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and have taken residence in West Germany.

This practical issue, along with other compelling political considerations, has created a natural bond of common interest between Prague and Moscow. Thus Moscow should have had no fears of a political rapprochement between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. What the Czechoslovaks wanted from West Germany was no more than what the Russians themselves have sought from the West Germans, the French, Italians, British, and others, namely, economic support in the form of technical assistance, possibly hard currency loans, and expanded trade.

It is hard for me, therefore, to see any justification for Soviet fears on either the ideological or strategic level. Presumably, Kosygin, Brezhnev, and Suslov were satisfied with Prague's assurances of continued fidelity; but others in the Soviet policymaking machinery felt otherwise.

RESULTS OF THE SOVIET INVASION AND MILITARY OCCUPATION

As for the results of the Soviet invasion and military occupation, we have only the perspective of just over 2 weeks upon which to make some judgments. But some things seem rather self-evident.

First of all, the Soviets have destroyed—at least for now—Czechoslovakia's dream of a new road to socialism, as it was initially conceived. How far they will turn back the clock we do not know. If it is true—as it now appears—that hardline Stalinist types have assumed the upper hand in Moscow, then it seems fairly clear that in form and content Czechoslovakia might well experience a great reversal, perhaps even revert to the days of Novotny. Reports from Prague indicate that a widespread purge of liberals is expected. A new fear seems to have gripped their country, a fear reminiscent of the worst days of Stalinism in the 1950's. How well founded these fears are can only be demonstrated in the future.

A second result seems to be a perceptible hardening of Soviet policy. Reports of Soviet pressure against Rumania, again in the form of a demand for Warsaw Pact military maneuvers on Rumanian soil, indicates the extent to which the Russians seem determined to reassert a hardline-inspired obedience from its allies within the pact. Rumania's trouble stems from its independent foreign policy; internally the regime is very much hard line in character. Thus, it is possible that all of Eastern Europe may experience a renewal of modified Stalinism.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS

For Czechoslovakia the implications of the crisis are profound. For 8 months the Czechoslovaks had hoped for a genuine renewal of their country and the achievement of a new and higher form of political life, one that would preserve socialism but combine with it a genuine respect for the dignity of man. In a word, to synthesize the humanism of Thomas Masaryk with the socialism of Karl Marx.

All this appears to have been lost.

The Soviets have imposed a military occupation on Czechoslovakia; they now control all the mechanism of power. For a while they may continue to work through Dubcek, who has tried desperately to preserve the gains of his regime and the dignity of his country, but reports from Prague in the last week indicate the odds that he faces.

For the Soviets, the invasion and occupation has by far the most serious implications. For a few weeks they had a choice, whether to accept the natural evolution of what might have been a competing form of socialism or to insist upon the Soviet model. In other words, whether to face the future hopefully and boldly or return to the dismal and unpromising past: they chose the latter; and by so doing they have demonstrated again that they cannot tolerate any semblance of freedom within their system or that of a fraternal ally. From this clearly articulated political reality, it is possible to derive the most dire implications: a return of the cold war; an exacerbation of tensions in Europe; renewal of Stalinism on a modified scale not only in Eastern Europe but in Russia itself.

The problem of bloc unity has been exacerbated by the invasion; this has serious implications for Soviet claims to leadership and control over the world Communist movement.

Once the Russians crossed the frontier to chastise their fraternal Czechoslovak ally, they inevitably quickened the centrifugal forces of bloc disunity. In recent years the Soviets have tried to manage this problem; by and large, they have failed. Only by the most vigorous arm-twisting and application of much political pressure were they able to get even respectable support for their unity conference scheduled in Moscow at the end of this year.

Intervention has magnified this problem: it has deepened the rift in the world Communist movement; it has shaken the confidence of the fraternal parties; it has weakened Russia's control over the movement:

The Russians won for themselves the everlasting hatred of the Czechoslovak people, including the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;

Threats of intervention in Rumania embittered relations with the Bucharest party leaders and firmly set that nation against Moscow;

The Chinese Communists seized upon the intervention issue to broaden their attack on Moscow's leadership;

The powerful Western parties in France and Italy and those of lesser strength elsewhere are visibly shaken and protested the invasion.

Even the CPUSA is split right down the middle, its leadership in open contention, its strength dissipated.

In brief, intervention has thrown world communism into disarray; it has sown the seeds of distrust of Soviet power; it has accelerated bloc disunity.

Can this bloc unity be restored?

I doubt it. Certainly it will take more than the next 3 months for the Russians to pacify their agitated brethren and to rebuild their shattered confidence in the "wisdom" of the Soviet leadership. Scrapping of the Moscow unity conference may be part of the cost to the Russians when the full bill of intervention has been totaled up.

At the same time the Russians will be hard pressed to repair their damaged image among their neutralist supporters in the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa. Having passed themselves off as protector and friend of the small nation against the imperialist West for decades, they are now faced with the problem of reconciling their propaganda claim with hard, demonstrated evidence of Soviet imperialistic intervention very much in the classic 19th Century manner.

We Americans can take little comfort in the events of the last weeks, however much we may insist that this was really a family affair. In a narrow sense it was a family affair, but it was a family affair that has far-reaching implications for East-West relations. Surely none of us can now advocate a policy of reducing our troop strength in NATO. The military balance in Central Europe has been radically changed by the presence of 600,000 Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia. Before the August crisis, reduction of our troop strength in Europe appealed to me; this is no longer the case. For, if this invasion has demonstrated anything, it has demonstrated the speed, the efficiency, and the skill with which the Soviets could launch an invasion of conventional forces and complete the conquest of a country. All this talk of nuclear deterrence now seems to have been somewhat meaningless: conventional forces have proven their value once again. The West must take this into account when it rethinks its military policy in the aftermath of the crisis in Czechoslovakia.

EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP

Perhaps, it is in the realm of Soviet-American relations that the crisis may well have the most serious implications. This invasion has destroyed a premise of American policy and some of the basic assumptions of our Nation's policymakers. Ever since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, perhaps even before that, we Americans, especially our specialists in Communist bloc affairs, came to believe that Soviet conduct in foreign affairs was becoming rational; that it was somewhat tractable and consistent, restrained and more according to traditional Russian interests. Threat of a thermonuclear war introduced a new ingredient in Soviet foreign policy calculations that tended to generate these characteristics. Serious analysts have never denied the Soviet commitment to ideology or its relevance to foreign policy; but all available evidence, particularly the compelling reality of the thermonuclear bomb with virtually instantaneous, massive,

range delivery systems, pointed in direction of a more stabilized Soviet on, a nation whose stake in world ce and in the continuation of reasonly good relations with the United tates were absolutely necessary.

August 20 seems to have changed this, at least at this reading.

If the Soviets cannot feel secure and stable with a Czechoslovakia whose ethnic origins are Slavic, whose ideological preferences—at least the leadership's—are Communist, and whose national policy and national interests are by any objective assessment directed toward a close relationship with Moscow—if this is the case with Czechoslovakia, if military invasion is their reaction to change within the political system of their friend and ally—how then can there ever be a tolerable relationship established in Soviet-American relations?

If this Czechoslovak crisis is indicative of the quality of thought and judgment of Moscow's collective leadership, then I do not see how we can avoid serious trouble ahead.

AND THE FUTURE

Probably within any political system, a collective leadership is a potentially dangerous leadership, for it can breed uncertainty and instability in policy formulation. We have seen the results of this phenomenon in the reversal of the decisions made at Cierna and Bratislava: the hardline faction was apparently able to overturn the judgment of the most prominent figures in the political leadership and commit the Soviet Union to a political course the end and implications of which only God knows.

In all probability the future will be filled with uncertainty for us. We have come to know Kosygin and Brezhnev, but who are these other men and what are their purposes? For this reason, I was delighted to read President Johnson's warning to Moscow against unleashing the "dogs of war" in Eastern Europe. While our foreign policy options remain severly restricted in Eastern Europe, still we have by this declaration put the Soviet leadership on guard that their actions can have the most serious impact on our relations and those of our NATO allies.

In the final analysis, therefore, the August crisis may well have more far-reaching implications for East-West relations than was the case in any other crisis since the fall of 1962. For, should the Russians, under the pressure of new hardline forces within that nation's leadership, inaugurate a new era of Stalinism in East Europe, they would inevitably sharpen the cold war, the consequence of which would surely be, a strengthening of NATO forces, particularly those of West Germany, a downgrading of the goals of detente, and a general renewal of East-West tensions.

We face a dangerous future; there seems to be no doubt of that.

What of the Czechoslovaks and their future? The situation is far from clear. A harsh Soviet occupation has been predicted. The exodus of reformers has already begun, certainly the most grievious commentary on Soviet tyranny; the brains of the country are being forced into exile at Soviet gunpoint.

Now there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union has the power to impose a total police state system on Czechoslovakia. But it is one thing to rule a nation; it is quite another to lead a nation. Novotny could rule Czechoslovakia; he could not lead it; he was a total failure and the Communists themselves disposed of him. The limits to which any ruler can go, including the Soviets, are imprecisely defined, but they exist. Being political realists, the Russians know this. Thus, this reality can and possibly will act as a mitigating force on Soviet rule on Czechoslovakia. It is significant that the Soviets have tried to avoid unpleasant confrontations with people; for the most part they accepted their taunts; and they have withdrawn their tanks from the cities to areas where they will be less conspicuous. The Russians know they have a serious political problem on their hands; they know there are limits to authoritarianism.

Another hopeful aspect is the nature of the Czechoslovak people themselves. They have the stuff, the inner discipline, the great qualities that it takes to resist the occupier and still seek to control their environment and political destiny. Centuries of foreign rule have instilled in them these unique qualities, qualities that have been amply manifested in recent weeks. By their obstinate resistance, the people of Czechoslovakia may yet force the Russians to adopt a more conciliatory course. The meeting of the CPC's Presidium over this past weekend and the carryover of many liberals by Dubcek into the new Presidium are manifestations of this manly courage. Surely, this is a subtle act of defiance; whether Dubcek can get away with it remains to be seen.

But we would deceive ourselves if we believed that developments in Czechoslovakia could ever go beyond the permissible limits established by the Soviet Union. In large measure, therefore, the future of Czechoslovakia depends on the future of the Soviet Union: it is the Russians who determine the bounds of liberalism, conservatism, reaction, and neo-Stalinism. In the final analysis it is they who call the tune. We can only watch with great concern political developments within the Soviet Union itself. If the Russians have clearly gone back to the past and to the path of Stalin with all its dire implications for world communism, the West, and Russia itself, then we can expect the worst for Russia as we can for Czechoslovakia; but if this August crisis proves to be only a momentary divergence, if it is recognized as a gross blunder and miserable failure—which objectively it is—to be righted by counterpressures and corrective action by leaders more responsive to Russia's genuine best interest and that of its people, then this reevaluation can be expected to make a favorable impact in Prague, as indeed elsewhere.

Meanwhile, we can only hope that a new, repressive madness has not taken over that strange land of Russia.

We can only hope that the demonstrated rationality and restraint of Russia's leaders in the immediate past will be resumed.

We can only hope that the Russians will not try to arrest and reverse the main thrust of history within the world Communist movement, the thrust toward divergency, diversity, independence, indeed, interdependence. We must hope that they cannot arrest and reverse the forward thrust of progress, especially in the political and social realm, that has been so marked a positive characteristic of Soviet life in the past decade.

For, our fate and that of all mankind is involved in the decisions taken in Moscow during the weeks and months ahead.

Let us pray that historians of the future will not write that the Russians in the autumn of 1968 turned their backs on their responsibilities to civilization.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE APPROPRIATIONS, 1969

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 18037) making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and related agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I call up my amendment in the nature of a substitute for the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. SPONG] and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted by the amendment offered by the Senator of Virginia [Mr. SPONG], insert the following:

On page 16, line 5, after the period insert the following language:

"For grants and payments under the Act of September 30, 1950, as amended (20 U.S.C., ch. 13), and under the Act of September 23, 1950, as amended (20 U.S.C., ch. 9), $90,965,000, fiscal year 1968; *Provided*, That these funds shall not be subject to the provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Statute, Revised Statutes 3679, 31 U.S.C. 665 (c): *Provided further*, That the expenditure of this appropriation shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of title II of the Revenue and Expenditures Control Act of 1968."

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, are we operating under any controlled time arrangement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no controlled time.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, my amendment in the nature of a substitute deals with a very urgent matter concerning the schoolchildren of our country, as does the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. SPONG], for whose amendment my amendment provides a substitute.

In our conference just before the adjournment for the two political conventions, the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House agreed unan-

imously on the provision of $90,965,000 to meet these critical needs.

That money has been withheld by the President. The purpose of my substitute is to make this money immediately available for the duration of the fiscal year and to provide exemptions from the prohibitory statutes which the President relied upon in freezing the funds.

I propose to discuss the amendment a little later, as I understand the plan of the leadership of the Senate is not to pursue any rollcall votes today.

In that event, I shall defer my discussion in detail of the amendment until we are ready to begin operating on the bill.

I ask that my amendment be made the pending business.

May I have the attention of the majority leader? I have just offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which is lying on the desk. I understood the plan of the leadership was not to have any rollcall votes this afternoon. In that event, I shall defer action on my amendment until somewhat later.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may yield, without losing his right to the floor, so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MUNDT. I yield the floor.

AMENDMENT NO. 939

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] I submit an amendment. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed and lie on the table, and I also ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 59, lines 20 and 21, strike out "$1,873,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$2,088,000,000".

Mr. PASTORE. I intend to call up the amendment tomorrow, and I should like to explain it at this time.

This is an amendment to increase the appropriation for the Office of Economic Opportunity by $215 million to a total of $2.088 billion for fiscal year 1969.

This modest increase is the absolute minimum with which we can effectively continue the attack on poverty. It is almost $100 million less than the amount Congress authorized for the antipoverty program and the amount the President requested for OEO in his budget.

Why does the Office of Economic Opportunity need an additional $215 million?

Only last December, Congress adopted a 2-year authorization bill for OEO. It proposed that $1.98 billion be appropriated for fiscal year 1968 and $2.18 billion for fiscal year 1969.

The President supported these authorizations and requested a $2.18 billion appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

Yet, last year, Congress appropriated only $1.773 billion—$200 million less than the authorization figure.

This year, the House and the Senate appropriations Committees have proposed an appropriation of $1.873 billion—a full $307 million under the authorization figure and the President's request.

I should like to add at this juncture, parenthetically, that I have heard time and time again, until I have become weary of hearing it, the criticism being leveled at the administration, that it talks big and then does not provide the money. The fact is—and if anyone wants to challenge me on this, I would like to debate the subject—that every time Congress has acted on authorizations for the poverty program, we have never appropriated the full amount that was authorized and the amount that was requested by the President of the United States. I believe this is our opportunity, at this time, to correct it.

Some may say this is a windfall—$100 million more than the program received last year—in a time of general belt tightening.

But is it? Let us look at the fiscal facts surrounding the antipoverty program.

In the arithmetic of the administration of Federal programs, an increase of $100 million does not mean 100 million of new money for an agency or department to use as it wills. In fact, the increase for OEO contained in the appropriation bill before us actually is less than the amount necessary to keep current OEO programs going.

OEO officials testified that simply to continue present programs at current levels, an appropriation of $1.392 billion is required. This means no money to start any new antipoverty efforts.

This situation comes about because of the refunding cycles of community action, legal services, Job Corps, health centers, and many other antipoverty activities. Further, a number of programs which need only modest funding in the startup stage require greater amounts when they become fully operational. For example, comprehensive health centers needed only $33 million in fiscal year 1968 but would require about $90 million to carry on this year.

Therefore, far from providing OEO with new program funds, the Appropriations Committee mark of $1.873 billion could actually necessitate a cutback in antipoverty programs. It falls $59 million short of the amount needed for current programs.

This will hardly prick the consciences of those who disapprove of the whole concept of OEO, but they may not be aware of what has been happening lately.

The latest figures show that almost 3 million Americans came out of poverty in 1967. Since OEO was created in 1964, well over 7 million people have left poverty—more than 2½ times the annual rate for the preceding 5-year period.

Obviously, somebody has been do something right. OEO does not t credit for all of the improvement, t there can be no denying that the ne programs of the last 3 years have ha a significant impact.

Another exciting development in the war on poverty is the success of the partnership between the Federal Government and the Nation's business community in developing employment training and jobs for the hard-core unemployed.

This is the job opportunities in the business sector—JOBS—program operated by the National Alliance of Businessmen.

The most recent figures show that NAB has secured 165,000 pledges and has actually placed 40,000 previously unemployed, and once largely unemployable, persons in jobs.

It is significant to note that, last year, $60 million in OEO funds went into this important program.

But there are still 26 million Americans living below the poverty line. There are 5 million Americans whose earnings even when they are working full time do not bring them above the poverty line.

These are the poverty targets. These are the targets which an increased OEO appropriation will help us reach. We cannot do so by cutting the funds available in the war against poverty.

Look, for example, at what has happened to Headstart Follow Through. Headstart had the almost universal endorsement of the Congress and the public, but it has still been impossible to begin the entirely logical Headstart Follow Through program.

The Follow Through program is to find out how these programs develop and to reach out and talk with the people who are under these programs, to find out whether or not they have been effective. I believe it would be foolhardy on our part to spend millions and millions of dollars to initiate a program and to train people under it and then not follow through to find out how the program has developed.

Evaluation of Headstart has made it clear that there is a need for a program to reinforce the significant gains made in Headstart and to insure that Headstart children continue at a rapid rate of development when they enter school. This is particularly true in the case of more than two-thirds of the children who derive benefit only from the short summer programs of Headstart.

OEO and the Office of Education have been ready to implement this in-school phase now for almost 2 years. They need funds. In fiscal year 1968 the President requested and was ready to use $120 million to begin a Follow Through program; the Congress voted only $15 million—barely enough to maintain an experimental pilot program effort at a very modest level.

This year's tight budget request was $50 million, which would provide $26 million for program expansion beyond the operation of last year's classes and the continued participation of last year's children in the program. An appropria-